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NOTE AND COMMENT 
INDUCING BRSA.CH oF AGRE£MSNT BY EMPLOYSS No-r ro JoxN A LABOR 
UmoN, IN 0RDr:R ro CoMPSL UNIONIZATION oF PLAINTIFF'S BusINSss.-In 
Hitchman Coal & Coke Company v. John Mitchell, et al., (Dec. 10, 1917), 38 
Sup. Ct. 65, the novel question was presented to the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States, as to whether or not members of a labor Union could be enjoined 
from conspiring to persuade, and persuading, without violence or show of 
violence, plaintiff's employees, not members of the Union,-and who were 
working for plaintiff not for a specified time, but under an agreement not to 
continue in plaintiff's employment if they joined the Union, this agreement 
being fully known to defendants,-secretly to agree to join the Union and 
continue working for plaintiff until enough had agreed to join, so that a strike 
could be called, and plaintiff be thereby forced to unionize its business of 
mining coal. 
The majority of the court held that a permanent injunction should issue, 
Mr. Justice PxT~Y, delivering the opinion, Mr. Justice BRANDSIS, delivering 
a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice HOLMIOS, and Mr. Justice CLARKS, 
concurred. 
NOTE AND COMMENT 
In 1907, plaintiff was the owner of 5000 acres of coal land in ·west Vir-
ginia, and employed 200 or 300 men in mining about 300,000 tons of coal 
annually. At that time all the mines in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, were 
operated as 'union-closed-shop' mines, i. e., no one could hold a job about 
them without being a member of the United Mine Workers of America. All· 
the mines in West Virginia, except a very few, were 'non-union-open-shop' 
mines, while those in Pennsylvania were partly 'open,' and partly 'closedr 
mines. 
Plaintiff had opened their West Virginia mines in 1!)0;2, and operated them 
as "non-union," until April 1903, when, "under threats from the Union 
officials," that another mine owned by plaintiff in Ohio, already unionized, 
would be closed .down by a strike "if the men at the West Virginia mine 
were not allowed to organize," they consented to the unionization of the latter. 
For the next three years strikes followed because of difficulties with the 
plaintiffs as to scales of wages, and also between the Union and plaintiff's 
competitors, for which plaintiff was in no way responsible. The result was 
that the mining business in West Virginia was greatly disorganized during 
this period, to the loss both of the plaintiff, and the workmen, and plaintiff's-
mines stood idle from April to June, 1906. 
In June, 1906, a self-appointed committee of the former employees of 
plaintiff, came to plaintiff to inquire upon what terms they could return to-
work, and were informed they could come back but not as members of the 
United Mine Workers of America; that plaintiff would not recognize that 
Union; that contracts would be made with individual workmen only; that 
the mines would be run non-union; that if any one wanted to join the union 
he could do so, but if he did, he could not remain in the employ of the 
company; that if he worked for plaintiff, he would have to work as a non-
union man. Each employee was told this, and agreed to it before he was em-
ployed. The employment was not for a specified time. Operations were 
resumed, upon these conditions, June 12, 1906, and carried on with entire 
satisfaction to all parties for more than a year. 
About July 1, 1907, three of the defendants, G., Z., and W., called on 
plaintiff's general manager to submit "a proposition for the unionization of 
the mine;" the manager refused to consider this, but at the request of these 
defendants laid it before plaintiff's board of directors, who rejected it. At 
some of the interviews plaintiff's manager told these defendants the terms 
upon which the men were employed. 
In September, 1907, another defendant, H., was sent by the Union to or-
ganize all the mines in the district where plaintiff's mines were located~ 
H. had distinct and timely notice that the contract between plaintiff and its 
employees expressly provided that the latter, if they joined the Union, should 
not remain in plaintiff's employment. 
H. remained more than a month in the vicinity, interviewing as many of 
plaintiff's employees as possible, resorting to deception and abuse, holding 
public meetings, at which he abused plaintiff's superintendent, and intimat-
ing that wages paid by plaintiff would probably be reduced unless the mines 
were unionized. He kept secret the names of those who had agreed to join 
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the Union, but said that "after he got the majority he would organize the 
place," and that "they had sixty men signed up," about enough to "crack off.," 
and "were going to shut down the mine as soon as he got a few more." 
At another non-union mine in the same vicinity, not belonging to plain-
tiff., the same defendant, H., had been laboring with the employees, and 
about the middle of October, had succeeded in shutting it down. 
October 24, 1907, plaintiff. brought its bill for an injunction against the 
defendants alleging that they have unlawfully formed themselves into a r.on-
spiracy the purpose of which is "to cause your orator's mine to be shut down, 
its plant to remain idle, its contracts to be broken and unfulfilled, until your 
-0rator shall submit to the demand of the Union" to unionize its plant, and 
thereafter to employ only Union men. · 
A final decree granting a perpetual injunction was made in 1913 by the 
District Court, (202 Fed. 512); this was reversed by the Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 1914 (214 Fed. 685) ; afterwards an appeal was allowed, but 
dismissed by the Supreme Court, although a writ of certiorari was granted 
(241 U. S. 644). Upon final hearing the decree of the Circuit Court of 
Appeals was reversed, and the decree of the District Court modified, and 
affirmed as modified. 
Mr. Justice PITNsy's opinion is based upon propositions which may be 
-summarized: 
As to plaintiff's rights: (I) Plaintiff is as free to make non-membership 
in a union a condition of employment, as the working man is free to join the 
union. This is part of the constitutional right of personal liberty and private 
property, not to be taken away even by legislation, except under the para::-
mount police power. (2) Plaintiff. is entitled to be protected in the status 
created by the agreement,-even if it was terminable at the will of either 
party, for that does not make it at the will of others, and by the weight of 
authority the unjustified interference of third parties is actionable although 
the employment is at will. 
(3) Plaintiff is entitled to the continued good will of its employees, and 
the value of the relation is in the reasonable probability that by treating its 
employees fairly it will be able to retain them, and to secure others as needed. 
(4) The right of action for persuading an employee to leave his employer 
is universally recognized, and rests upon fundamental principles of general 
application, and not upon the English Statute of Laborers. 
As to defendants' juslificati-On: (1) No question of the rights of em-
ployees is involved. Even if they have a right to strike, defendants have no 
-right to instigate a strike, since they are not the agents of the employees. 
(2) While defendants and other workmen have a right to form unions, 
and invite other workingmen to join, generally, the right is not absolute, but 
must be exercised with a reasonable regard to the conflicting rights of others. 
That a defendant wants the services is not a justification for enticing an 
employee. 
(3) Defendants' efforts were not bona fide to enlarge the membership of 
the Union, but to organize the mine as a means to compel the owners to change 
their method of operation. 
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(4) The means employed by defendants were unlawful, even though peace-
able, since it was a combination to procure concerted breaches of lmown 
contracts, intentionally and maliciously designed to inflict unnecessary dam-
age on plaintiff by a strike, making it difficult if not impossible for plaintiff 
to run its mine non-union, as it had a right to do. 
(5) This is not a case of defendants withholding fro01 an employer an 
economic need,-a supply of labor,-until he assents to be governed by the 
Union regulations, for defendants have no supply of labor, needed by plaintiff, 
for the supply of non-union labor was ample in the district. 
(6) Defendants are not justified by competition, for they are not com-
petitors of the plaintiff, and if they were, their method would be unfair, and 
subject to injunction, just as it would be for a competing trader to induce 
his rival's clerks to desert him at a critical time in order to cripple his 
business. 
The District Court held the United Mine Workers of America and its 
branches, an unlawful organization under the laws of West Virginia and 
under the Federal Anti-Trust Act; also that the injunction should apply to 
three defendants not served with summons, and to the officers, not parties to 
the suit, but who had succeeded in office some of the original defendants, and 
also all present and future members of the Union without naming them. 
These were held to be erroneous. 
The most important parts of Mr. Justice BRAND£IS' dissenting opinion 
relate to (x) Unionizing plaintiff's mine; (2) Attempt to induce employees to 
violate their contracts; and (3) Persuading employees to leave plaintiff's 
employment. 
As to (1) a distinction, based upon the testimony is drawn between 
"unionizing the mine," and "unionizing the employees ;" the latter is only 
inducing the employees to join the Union; the former- is inducing the em-
ployer to enter into a collective agreement with the Union (a) to employ only 
members of the Union; (b) to negotiate only with its officers as to wages, 
hours, etc.; (c) to treat only with the Union's representatives in settling 
disputes arising from the employment. 
Each of these is legal. To obtain them, any or all, men may strive or 
strike; and if a Union may strike to obtain them, why not to secure an 
agreement to provide for them? There is no coercion in the legal sense, 
where a Union merely endeavors to induce employees to join a Union, with 
the intention thereafter to order a strike, unless the employer consents to 
unionize his shop. He is free to accept the agreement or disadvantage as he 
chooses. If it is coercion to threaten to strike unless plaintiff consents to a 
closed union-shop, it is also coercion to threaten not to give employment 
unless the applicant will consent to a closed non-union shop. Either has the 
equal right to withhold such an economic need from the other; in a legal 
sense an agreement entered into, under such circumstances, is voluntarily 
entered into. 
As to (2), there is evidence of an attempt to induce plaintiff's employees 
to agree to join the Union; but none whatever of any attempt to induce them 
to violate their contract. Until an employee actually joined the Union, he 
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was not, under the contract, called upon to leave plaintiff's employ; there was 
no breach of contract until he both joined and failed to withdraw. If it was 
intended to secure agreements to join when a large number had consented 
to do so, and then join together, and strike, unless plaintiff consented to 
unionize his mine,-this would clearly be permissible under the contract. 
As to (3), to induce third persons to leave an employment, or not to 
-enter it, if done maliciously and without justifiable cause is actionable al-
though such persons are free to exercise their own will. The contract here 
added nothing to plaintiff's right in this connection, since it was terminable 
at will. Persuasion, merely as a means is lawful, if, and only if, for a 
justifiable cause; here this was to strengthen the Union, and the individual's 
bargaining power by collective bargaining, so the workmen's condition would 
be improved. It should not be doubted that to induce workmen to leave or 
not to.enter employment to advance such purpose, is justifiable when they are 
·not bound by contract to remain in such employment. 
At the same time a decision was rendered in Eagle Glass & Manufactur-
.ing Co. v. Thomas W. Rowe, et al., 38 Sup. Ct. So, involving the same situa-
tion, Mr. Justice PI'l'N:£Y pronouncing the opinion of the majority of the 
Court, and the same justices dissenting as in the Hitchman case. In this 
Glass case, the Circuit Court of Appeals, had said : "There is nothing in the 
contract which requires such employees to work for any fixed or definite 
period. If any of them should decide to join [the Union] the plaintiff could 
not recover damages for the breach of the same. * * * The only penalty is 
that they cannot secure further employment from the plaintiff. * * * Such 
being the case it would be unreasonable to hold the Union liable in damages 
to the plaintiff because they had used lawful methods to induce the non-
union miners to become members of their organization. We fail to see how 
-this contract can be taken as a basis for restraining the defendants from using 
lawful methods for inducing the parties to the contract to join the organi-
zation." 
Mr. Justice P1tN:£Y says: "This reasoning, essential to the decision reach-
·ed, is erroneous for several reasons: (stated in the Hitchman case) (a) be-
-cause plaintiff was entitled by law to be protected from interference with the 
good will of its employees, although they were at liberty to quit the employ-
ment at pleasure; (b) because the case involved no question of the rights 
·of employers, and their right to quit gave to defendants no right .to instigate 
a strike; and (c) because the methods pursued by the defendants were not 
lawful methods." These are substantially the same as (3) above, under 
Plaintiff's rights, and (1) and (4) under Defendant's justification. 
It is only in (4) above, that "procuring concerted breaches of known con-
tracts," is relied on as ·one of the elements of unlawfulness. Mr. Justice 
BRAND:£IS, (2) above, says there is no evidence "whatever of any attempt to 
-induce them to violate their contracts." 
The majority opinion seems to consider that "agreeing to join" the Union, 
and still continuing to work for the plaintiff, until the employee should 
actually be taken into the Union, and becoming thereby subject to its juris-
-Oiction, was a substantial breach of the contract of employment, and if this 
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was induced by the defendant with lmowledge, it was unlawful. Mr. 
Justice BRANDJUS on the other hand held that only by continuing to work for 
the plaintiff after the employee had actually been taken into the Union would 
be a breach of the contract. He seemed to admit that inducing the employer 
to do that would be technically unlawful, but does not state very clearly that 
such would be the case, or that it would be important if it were the case. In 
short "procuring a breach of contract" does not seem to have had much to 
do with either the majority or the minority opinion. 
Suppose the first day H undertook to unionize plaintiff's mi~e, he had 
induced all the employees to join the Union,-it would then have been their 
duty, under the contract, to quit working for plaintiff at once,-and the 
result would be as disastrous as if they had wrongfully struck,-but plaintiff 
certainly could not then have successfully complained, for that reason. On 
the other hand, if they had not quit, or if H had induced them not to quit 
as the contract called for, could the plaintiff sue them or H, or the Union for 
damage for breach of contract, or inducing breach thereof in not quitting? 
.Perhaps, yes,-but certainly only for nominal damages; its remedy against 
employees would be discharge, and if it discharged one, and the others then 
quit, would it have an action against them? Certainly not. 
The case would seem to stand then just as it would if there was no 
breach of contract,-and then, as conceded in both opinions, inducing plaintiffs 
to join the Union or 'going on a strike,' is actionable only if the means used 
or the purpose is otherwise unlawful. The majority opinion seems to go the 
whole· length of holding that lmowingly to persuade employees to join (or 
agree to join) the Union, with the purpose of thereafter being able to order 
them to strike, if the Union so determines, is an unlawful purpose and can 
be enjoined,-because it disturbs or tends to disturb the status quo, or the 
'reasonable probability' that it will remain the same. This certainly goes a 
long way in curtailing the right and liberty of one person, or a group of per· 
.sons, to persuade one another to enter into co-operation for their supposed 
mutual and otherwise lawful benefit. 
Suppose that when G, L & W, asked plaintiff to unionize its mine, it had 
agreed to do so; this would have been the same sort of a breach of the con-
tract by it, as the agreement to join the Union was by the employees in the 
case. Would the employees then have had an injunction against the plaintiff 
to prevent it from unionizing its mine, and discharging its employees, or 
being able thereafter to do so, if they did not join the Union, contrary to the 
agreement? We submit that to be consistent, the Court would have to hold 
so. For do not the employees have a right to the same status quo, or to a 
'reasonable probability' that their employer will not, at the instance of some 
one else, unionize its mine, when it believes it would advance its interests to 
do so? It is doubtful if the court would so hold. And if it did, would not 
an employer complain that the court had seriously curtailed its constitutional 
rights of liberty and property by compelling it to operate its mines 'non-union' 
when it wanted to have them 'union.' 
Are not the employees and the employers entitled to the 'equal protection', 
of the laws by an equal application thereof? They should be. 
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In recent years it seems to be conceded that the "right of association for 
collective bargaining", should be recognized and protected by the laws in a 
way similar to the protection extended to that 'exclusive right' included in the 
ownership and control of property; in fact that in no other practical way can 
those who have no property secure substantial economic equality with those 
who have property. If this is true should not the man's property in himself 
and the good will of his associates, be legally protected in the same way and 
to the same extent as the ownership of tangible property is? H. L. W. 
WHO IS AN Al.mN Em:uv?-One Gustav Muller, a native German, resided 
in England on May 2oth, 1915. He had never been naturalized. He owned a 
leasehold house in England, and on the date just mentioned he executed a 
power of attorney to one John White to sell this leasehold house and make 
proper conveyance of the same. Six days later he was permitted by the Brit-
ish Govemrp.ent to return to Germany, and he started the same day, May 
26th. He was known to be in Germany on June nth, but the date of his 
arrival was unknown. On June 2 the leasehold was sold to Tingley, but the 
latter, upon learning the facts here given respecting Muller refused to proceed 
with the contract of sale, and commenced an action for a declaration that 
the contract was illegal because at the time it was made the defendant, 
Muller, was an alien enemy. Evs, J., held that this fact had not been proved, 
and dismissed the action, and an appeal w~ taken to the Court of Appeal, 
Tingley v. Muller, [1917] L. R. 2 Ch. 144, and the decision of Evs, J., was 
sustained. ' 
The case raises the broad question of who is an alien enemy, and six 
judges of the Court of Appeal wrote extensive opinions upon it. All the 
judges agreed that Muller's German nationality and allegiance did not make 
him an alien enemy. Five of them agreed that his departure from England 
for the purpose of returning to Germany did not make him an alien enemy, 
and that he should actually have reached Germany before the character of 
alien enemy attached to him. They differed as to the proof necessary to show 
his return. Evs, J., had held that evidence of his departure for Germany on 
May 26th did not prove his arrival in Germany by June 2, and two judges of 
the Court of Appeal, agreed. But the other three judges who thought such 
arrival was necessary to be shown, were of opinion that there was a pre-
sumption of fact that he arrived within seven days after leaving England. 
SCRUTTON, L. J., thought that Muller became an alien enemy the moment 
he departed for Germany, on the ground that he thereupon lost his com-
mercial or trade domicil in England and until he acquired another his 
national character reverted and this made him an alien enemy. 
The t~rm "alien enemy" is used with different meanings, depending on the 
principles or rules sought to be applied to the class so designated. Thus 
by United States Revised Statutes, Sec. 4067, retating to war, it is enacted 
that "all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or 
government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upward, shall be 
liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed, as alien enemies." 
This meaning is used in the Presidential Proclamations of April 6 and 
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November 16, 1917, regarding the conduct of alien enemies, within the 
United States. And it is the meaning employed in such cases as Dorsey v. 
Brigham, (1898) 177 Ill. 250, construing statues relating to naturalization. 
But in connection with the regulations of trade with the enemy an en-
tirely different meaning is given to the term. It was this meaning which was 
involved in Tingley v. Muller. The British Trading With the Enemy Act, 
1914, (4-5 Geo. 5, ch. 87), does not define the term, but the Trading with the 
Enemy Proclamation, No. 2, of September 9, 1914, defined an "enemy'' as 
any person of whatever nationality resident or carrying on business in the 
enemy country (Tingley v. Muller, p. 179, per SCRU'.ffl>N, L. J.). This is 
substantially the same definition as that given by our own Trading With the 
Enemy Act, of Oct. 6, 1917, which defines an enemy as a person residing in 
enemy territory or resident outside of the United States and doing business 
within enemy territory. 
The term as employed in these acts has clearly taken on a meaning rele-
vant to the purpose with which the acts were passed, namely, trade or com-
merce. Nationality has nothing to do with the matter, and domicil is not 
controlling. A German citizen residing in the United States, though domi-
ciled in Germany, is not an alien enemy, while a neutral domiciled in a 
neutral country may be an alien enemy, if he is engaged in business within 
enemy territory. Even a citizen of the United States would be an alien 
enemy if voluntarily resident in a hostile country. D1~Y ON PARTI£S, p. J. 
It is when one becomes a part of the business organization of the enemy, 
directly contributing by his trade or business to the welfare of the enemy, 
that he becomes an alien enemy under these Acts. The common law, which 
forbad trading with the enemy, as well as statutes regulating the matter, are 
"governed upon the public policy, which forbids the doing of acts that will 
be or may be to the advantage of the enemy State by increasing its capacity 
for prolonging hostilities in adding to the credit, money or goods, or other 
resources available to individuals in the enemy State. Trading with a Brit-
ish subject or the subject of a neutral state carrying on business in the hostile 
territory is as much assistance to the alien enemy as if it were with a sub-
ject of enemy nationality carrying on business in the enemy State, and, there-
fore, for the purpose of the enforcement of civil rights, they are equally 
treated as alien enemies." Per Lord ~DING, in Parler v. Freudenberg [1915] 
l K. B. 866. 
This is analogous to the view taken by the prize courts as to "enemy 
property." Thus in The Benito Estenger (1899), 176 U. S. 568, 571, the 
Supreme Court said that "property engaged in any illegal intercourse with 
the ·enemy is deemed enemy property, whether belonging to an ally or a 
citizen, as the illegal traffic stamps it with the hostile character." 
In the Millier Case there was nothing to show that the defendant had 
begun to carry on trade in Germany from any point outside of Germany, 
so that the establishment of commercial relations between him and the 
enemy could arise only through his re-establishment of residence in Ger-
many. Hence not until he actually reached Germany could he be of any 
advantage to the enemy in the way of trade, and the views of the ma-
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jority of the judges was in harmony with this commercial test of enemy 
character. 
In Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. [I9I6], 2 A. C. 307, 
the House of Lords was asked to go a step farther along the same line, and 
hold an English corporation to be an alien enemy because substantially all 
its shares were held by German subjects and its directors were all German 
subjects, three-fourths of them re,sident in Germany when war was de-
clared. The Court of Appeal had held that it was not an alien enemy. In 
the House of Lords, Lord !Lu.sBURY contended that it was an enemy, the 
corporation being substantially a mere partnership with a limited liability, all 
the partners presumably residing in enemy territory. He thought that "the 
unlawfulness of trading with the enemy could not be excused by the ingenuit:• 
of the means adopted." Lord ATKINSON thought an English Company might 
well be an alien enemy if in fact it could be shown that its real business ac-
tivity was in enemy territory, but that the record was silent on that point. 
Lord SHAW dissented from b<>th these positions, saying that since no div-
idends or assets could be paid to enemy shareholders, "and all trading with 
these shareholders * * being interpelled, there is no principle of law which 
would, in my humble opinion, justify the incongruity of dominating or re-
garding the Company itself as enemy either in character or in fact." Lord 
P.ARKJm, with whom concurred Lords.MERSSY and KINNSAR, took the posi-
tion that enemy character could not be given to the company "merely be-
cause enemy shareholders may after the war become entitled to their 
proper share of the profits of trading,'' but he thought it might assume 
enemy character "if its agents or the persons in de facto control of its af-
fairs, whether authorized or not, are resident in an enemy -country, or, 
wherever resident, are adhering to the enemy or taking instructions from 
or acting under control of enemies." He refused to admit, however, that 
the character of individual shareholders could affect the character of the 
Company; and on this point Lord P ARMOOR was in accord. 
The problems here suggested are equally relevant to conditions in this 
country. Our own TRADING WI'tH 'tHS ENSMY Ar::r, so far as corporations 
are concerned, does not include companies incorporated in the United States. 
However, the illegality of trailing with the enemy was recognized at com-
mon law, and the statute does not abrogate or narrow the common law 
principles, but only makes special regulations and provides special penalties 
for certain classes of acts of this character. The war has brought up a large 
number of cases in England involving both the common law and statutory 
rules relating to alien enemies, and in the controversies which are sure to 
arise here over trading with the enemy, these English cases are likely to 
prove of great practical value to American lawyers. E. R. S. 
WHSN IS A PRSFSREN'tIAL TRANsna ''REQUIRSD" 'to Br: Rr:coRDr:n?-The 
BANKRUP'.rCY Ar::r of 18g8 (as amended in I903 and 1910), after defining a 
preference, provides in § 6ob that preferences made under certain circum-
stances may be recovered from the preferred creditor if the latter had "rea-
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sonable cause to believe" that a preference was to be effected "at the time of 
the transfer * * * or of the recording or registering of the transfer if by 
!aw recording or registering thereof is required," such time being within four 
months before bankruptcy. Bankrupcty courts have for years been vexed 
with the question: When is a transfer "required" to be recorded under this 
provision of the Act? Various suggestions as to the meaning of the Act were 
made by the various Circuit Courts of Appeals, but the question was finally 
authoritatively decided-in part, at least-in 1916 in the case of Carey v. 
Donohue, 240 U. S. 430. This case decided that a transfer was not "re-
quired" to be recorded under the provisions of § 6o unless the requirement 
was (to quote from the opinion in that case) "for the protection of creditor:>, 
-the persons interested in the bankrupt estate, and in whose behalf, or in 
whose place, the trustee is entitled to act." The decision in Carey v. Donohue 
was that an Ohio statute requiring the recording of deeds of land in order 
to make them effective as against subsequent bona fide purchasers was not 
such a requirement as was meant by § 6o, and, of course, the decision is 
authoritative only on that point. The decision has therefore left open the 
question whether a statute requiring the recording of a transfer in order to 
make it effective as against ans creditor is sufficient to satisfy the provision 
of the statute, or whether the recording act must require the record in order 
to make the transfer valid as against the particular kind of creditor, who is 
in the particular case, represented by the trustee in bankruptcy. The Su-
preme Court of the United States has just decided, in Martin v. Commercial 
National Bank, 38 Sup. Ct. -, that it is the latter requirement that must 
be made. 
In a comment on Carey v. Donohue (14 M1cn. L. Rmr. 578, 581) it was said 
that the language of the court in that case "seems to indicate pretty clearly 
that if the local law requires recording as against any of the classes of per-
sons referred to in § 47a (2) there is a 'requirement' under § 6o. Under 
§ 47a (2) the trustee is given 'the rights, remedies and powers of a creditor 
holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings' on property in the custody, or 
coming into the custody of the bankruptcy court; as to property not in such 
custody, he has the 'rights, remedies and powers of a judgment creditor hold-
ing an execution duty returned unsatisfied.' The Supreme Court* * * seems 
to indicate, without regard to any distinction as to the two classes of property 
referred to in §47a (2), that if the local law requires recording as against 
any of the classes of creditors referred to in that section, recording is re-
quired under § 6o." This interpretation of the decision in Carey v. Donohue 
was also made by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 
the case of Bunch v. Maloney, 233 Fed. g61, 147 C. C. A. (affirming In re T. 
H. Bunch Commission Co., 225 Fed. 243), in which the court had under con-
sideration an Arkansas statute which provided that unrecorded chattel mort-
gages were void as against subsequent purchasers and lien creditors. Re-
ferring to the decision in Carey v. Donohue, the Court said: "Two views 
may be taken of the construction given by Carey v. Donohue to the recording 
t equirement clause of § 6ob: First, that it is for the benefit of creditors gen-
erally, because their rights are the concern of bankruptcy proceedings, but 
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does not embrace those cases in which the requirement is in the interest of 
persons outside the purview of the BANKRUPTCY A<:!r. Second, that as to the 
creditors themselves the clause picks up and adopts all the substantive and 
procedural limitations "Of the construction of the statute prescribing the 
requirement; and if in local practice creditors of a particular class, like gen-
eral creditors, could not: invoke the failure to record, a corresponding dis-
ability rests upon the trustee in bankruptcy." After discussing the result 
sought to be attained by this section of the BANKRUPTCY A<:!r, namely, the 
striking down of all secret liens, the court decided that the trustee in bank-
ruptcy might "invoke the remedy of § 6ob regardless of the local construction 
of the statute making a procedural distinction between creditors with a lien 
and those without." So also in the case of Hawkins v. Dannenberg Co., 234 
Fed. 752. Judge LAMBDIN of the District Court for the Second District of 
Georgia, though compelled to a contrary decision by the authority of Martin 
Y. Commercial National Bank, .228 Fed. 651, 143 C. C. A. 173, stated his opinion 
that under the decision in Carey v. Donohue, a provision of the Georgia statute 
making unrecorded mortgages void as against lien creditors only was never-
theless a "requirement" of reci>rding under § 6o of the BANKRUPTCY A<:!r. 
This is the same Georgia statute that was under consideration by the Su-
preme Court in the principal case. 
To the contrary, however, are the decision of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit in Martin v. Bank, supra (affirmed by the Su-
preme Court of the United State!; in the principal case) and the case of 
Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. 'Lawson, 237 Fed. 877, decided by 
the District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, in a case raised under 
the Iowa act providing for a recording of conditional sale contracts, and 
holding that the trustee in bankruptcy acquired no rights as against previ-
ously recorded conditional sale contract because the latter was "required" 
to be recorded only as against lien creditors. 
The question seems now to be finally settled in such a manner as to leave 
little room for doubt, but-it is unfortunate that the Act has been so framed as 
to make possible the result which has now finally been attained. As is said· 
by the court in Bunch v. Maloney, s"pra, in arguing against the construction 
now adopted by the Supreme Court, "It is difficult to perceive much result of 
consequence in the amendment of l9IO of § 6ob. Though twice amended for 
further effectiveness, it would be doubtful that the section, so. construed, 
would accomplish anything of practical value." And the cogency of this 
argument seems obvious. It is not the lien creditor that requires protection, 
but the general creditor, and it is to be regretted that the Supreme Court, 
in choosing between two possible courses open to it, has again, as in Carey, 
v. Donohue, taken the path that gives least power to the trustee in bank-· 
ruptcy, and most protection to the preferred creditor. E. H. 
JoY-RIDING, SIMPI.S AND CoMPOUND.-The wrongful use of another's auto-
mobile, even though accompanied by a trespassory taking, cannot, if followed 
by a return to the owner or an abandonment, be easily brought within the 
NOTE AND COMMENT 
definition of larceny at common law or under the ordinary larceny statutes, 
because of the requirement of intent to deprive the owner permanently oi 
his property. Smith v. State, 146 S. W. 547; State v. Boggs (Iowa, 1917), 
164 N. W. 759; McCLAIN, Ctm.!:INAL LAW, §566. Of course, such intent, at 
the time of taking, might be found in spite of return or abandonment, 
though it is doubtful whether the bare circumstances stated above would 
constitute sufficient evidence of that intent to go to the jury. Rex v. Phillips, 
2 East P. C. 662; Brennon v. Com., 16g Ky. 815; State v. Slingerland, 19 Nev. 
135; State v. Davis, 38 N. J. L. 176; People v. Flynn, 7 Utah 378. As a matter 
of law, intent to abandon at a distance, as distinguished from intent to re-
turn, has been held to be sufficient, on the principle that reckless indifference 
to harmful consequences is equivalent, in law as well as in ethics, to a direct 
purpose to produce such consequences. State v. Davis, supra. See also the 
other cases last above cited. Reg. v. Prince, 13 Cox C. C. 138, and People v. 
Cummings, 123 Cal. 26g. And, if this position be granted, such abandonment 
after a trespassory taking would make a case of larceny, on the theory of 
continuing trespass, even though, at the time of taking, the intent had been 
to return the property. Reg. v. Riley, 6 Cox C. C. 88; Weaver v. State, 77 
Ala. z6; Com. v. Wliite, II Cush. 483; State v. Coombs, 55 Me. 477. Again, 
in any of these cases, a charge of larceny of the gasoline consumed might 
he sustained. By hypothesis, this gasoline has been taken by trespass and 
carried away, mixed perhaps with more not consumed, and its consumption 
sufficiently evidences an intent to deprive the owner thereof. A defense 
based on the theory that defendant never thought of the gasoline might be 
difficult to dispose of as a matter of law, but could hardly succeed on the 
issue of fact to the jury. A difficulty arises here as to the description of 
the property, but an indictment descn"bing it as "gasoline in a quantity to 
the grand jurors unknown, of the value of twenty cents per gallon" would 
be sufficient BISHOP CRIM. PRo., § 553. If a specific quantity were laid in the 
indictment, a variance in the proof would not, at least under the more h"b-
eral authorities, be fatal. State v. Kreps, 8 Ala. 951; Com. v. Griffin, 21 Pick. 
523; Hagerman v. State, 54 N. J. L. 104 (semble); State v. Martin, 82 N. C. 
ft;2. These problems may be further complicated by the circumstances of 
the taking. If possession of the car was obtained by fraud, the taking could" 
still be made out under the doctrine of larceny by trick. McCr.Am CRm. 
LAW, §§ 559, 56o. If the owner of the car had delivered possession to de-
fendant as his servant, and he had abused the trust, the taking could be 
made out under the doctrine that in such a case the delivery vests a mere 
custody. lb. § 556. If, on the other hand, the defendant was a bailee of 
the car, no larceny could be established. As to whether embezzlement could 
be made out, that would depend, of course, upon the phraseology of the 
statutes, but it is doubtful whether the broadest of the embezzlement statutes 
would ~e held to cover the case, the difficulty turning chiefly upon the con-
struction of the words "fraudulently" and "convert." McCr.AIN, §§ 640, 641; 
87 Am. St. Rep. 19, note. 
The foregoing theories are fairly comprehensive, yet, as they involve 
difficulties of proof as well as some propositions of law which might not be 
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accepted by a conservative court, there is ample justification for legislation 
dealing specifically with this sort of wrongdoing. Whether the current leg-
islation can pass the ordeal of judicial construction, is not so clear. An Iowa 
statute provided that, "if any chauffeur or other person shall without the con-
sent of the owner take, or cause to be taken, any automobile or motor vehicle, 
and operate or drive or cause the same to be operated or driven, he shall be 
imprisoned,'' etc. 1913 SUPP. TO Com:, § 4823. In the case of State v. Boggs 
(Oct. 20, 1917), 164 N. W. 759, which was a prosecution under this statute, 
defendant having obtained prosecutor's permission to use his automobile for 
15 or 20 minutes, had driven it to a city eighty miles distant, where it was 
disabled and left in a garage. The state excepted to the refusal of the trial 
court to instruct that, "consent given by the owner of the car for a specific 
purpose or for a stated time, would not be consent to use the car for a 
different purpose, nor generally, nor for an unlimited time." The Supreme 
Court overruled the exception and volunteered the statement that, "The 
statute was not designed to punish one who obtains consent of the owner to 
take and operate his motor vehicle by misrepresentation or for a fraudulent 
r,urpose." 
The future course of development can readily be forecast. A· statute will 
be enacted covering the case of abuse of consent by excessive user, and an-
other covering the case of consent procured by fraud. We shall then have 
a tripartite division of the offense of joy-riding, analogous to the division of 
larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses. A few more statutes defining 
aggravated or compound joy-riding will complete the legal edifice, and further 
demonstrate the adaptability of the law to changing conditions. E. N. D. 
